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This paper examines the communications challenges facing central banks who will be sharing 
responsibilities with other agencies for macro-prudential objectives, in addition to conventional 
monetary policy goals. Following a description and analysis of surveys of central banks, and the 
attributes that make up an index of central bank transparency, some policy proposals are made. 
It is argued that a hybrid of inflation and price level targeting, combined with a requirement by 
the macro-prudential regulators to issue press releases much like central banks publish an 
announcement and rationale for the setting of monetary policy instruments, may improve the 
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1.  Introduction 
During the so-called ‘Great Moderation’ (Bernanke 2004) which began sometime in the 1980s 
and ostensibly ended around the summer of 2007 central banks around the world grew 
comfortable with several developments that were eventually reflected in their communications 
strategy. Enhancements in central bank autonomy led to more transparency. A greater focus on 
inflation control, a mandate made explicit in the case of inflation targeting central banks or 
implicit elsewhere, facilitated the monetary authority’s ability to anchor inflation expectations, 
generally through changes in a policy rate released at regularly pre-announced intervals. 
Equally important was the publication of supporting information by central banks in varying 
degrees of details to explain and justify the short-term strategy of monetary policy, and the 
steps to be undertaken to ensure that stated policy objectives would be met. As shown in 
Figure 1, these developments may well have contributed to enhancing the ability of central 
banks, especially in the industrial world, to reduce the frequency of changes in their policy 
rates. With the exception of Switzerland, and Japan, the monetary authorities considered in the 
figure left their policy rate settings unchanged a majority of the time in the 12 years (19980-
2009) covered by the data. Also evident from Figure 1 is the small fraction of time the policy 
rate changed by more than 25 basis points (bp) while the tendency for the setting of monetary 
policy to fall over time in most cases, with spells of tightening relatively less frequent, supports 
the moniker of the Great Moderation which is believed to characterize this period of 
macroeconomic history. Clearly, the events since the fall of 2007 have led to a rethinking of the 
role of the interest rate instrument, what has been gained from improvements in central bank 
transparency, and how the monetary authorities will deal with and communicate these 
responsibilities to the public. In particular, central banks will be expected to be more vocal 
about matters beyond their usual remit of maintaining price stability without jeopardizing 
healthy and sustainable real economic growth. 
The present paper is an attempt to provide some perspectives on central bank communication 
in a world that is expected to require central banks to become multi-taskers when it comes to 
fulfilling monetary policy and financial stability objectives. Even before the crisis there were 2 
 
multi-tasking central banks. Hence, a monetary authority that is also responsible for supervision 
and macro-prudential policies is also, arguably, a multi-tasking central bank. Since the jury 
remains open about the net benefits of the separation of central banking from supervisory 
duties the present paper focuses instead of the multi-tasking central bank that emerges from 
the crisis as being responsible not only for price stability, or a dual objective involving the real 
side of the economy, but also for financial system stability. As we shall see, the latter task poses 
some serious challenges not least of which how to communicate central banking policies when 
monetary authorities are also accountable for this additional burden.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  I rely on a data base developed as part of the 
creation of the central bank communications network (see 
http://www.wlu.ca/viessmann/Bank.htm; and http://www.central-bank-
communication.net/about/index.htm), unpublished survey data obtained from the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS)
 2, as well as portions of an earlier survey conducted by Mahdeva 
and Sterne (2000), and the Dincer-Eichengreen index of central bank transparency updated by 
Siklos (2010a). Rather than rely on a single aggregate measure of central bank transparency to 
assess the effectiveness of central bank communication, as has typically been done so far, I 
examine whether certain attributes of the index have become more important than others and 
whether these can assist our understanding of what can help reduce the risks stemming from 
financial system instability.  
Clearly, central bank performance will be partly determined by how well the monetary 
authority communicates with the public and this must include the impact of central bank 
communication on the behavior of the core variable central banks are mandated to control, 
namely inflation. However, as inflation has not proved to be enough to ensure financial system 
stability I consider some policy proposals and explore whether these can be meaningfully 
related to forms of central bank transparency.  Suggestions for reform, round out the planned 
                                                            
2 These include (selected) data from the following surveys: “The provision of monetary policy analysis and advice 
by central bank staff to central bank policy boards”, and “Communication of Monetary Policy by central banks”. 3 
 
                                                           
study. The results obtained by marrying the data about central banks collected independently 
together with information gathered via a series of unpublished BIS surveys previously cited will, 
hopefully, facilitate the introspection needed to enhance the resilience of monetary policy to 
recurring crises. In addition, the findings of this study may also serve as a reminder to these 
same institutions against complacency when the good times seem to require less action or 
foresight than in the harder times that inevitably come following a crisis.   
The data reveal that while central banks around the world have largely adopted the necessary 
arrangements to deal with the goal of maintaining price stability, their decision-making 
structures are not always adequate to deal with financial stability issues. For example, 
coordination mechanisms with other governmental institutions, given short shrift to date, are 
inadequate and must form part of any revamped central bank communication strategy.   
Moreover, in spite of the outward appearance that central banks may look alike to outside 
observers, their communication strategy reveals considerably more heterogeneity in behavior 
than is commonly believed to exist.  
2.  The Issues 
How much central bank transparency has changed over the past decade, the benefits derived 
thereof, remains contentious and there continues to be keen interest in evaluating central 
banks along this dimension. Even if there is some disagreement about the precise metrics one 
should use to establish a ‘league table’ for central banks, the only extensive cross-country 
analysis remains the one developed by Dincer and Eichengreen (2007), updated by Siklos 
(2010a).
3 Under the Dincer-Eichengreen scheme, central bank transparency is an aggregation of 
five components. They are: economic, procedural, policy, political, and operational forms of 
transparency.
4  An important feature of existing exercises aimed at measuring central bank 
 
3 Separately, Dincer and Eichengreen (2009) updated their data up to 2006 while Siklos’ update is up to 2009, 
inclusive. 
4 Inspiration for the index constructed by Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) can be traced to earlier work by Eijffinger 
and Geraats (2004) and Siklos (2002). 4 
 
                                                           
transparency is that the methodology is largely driven by the view that central banks have, at 
most, a dual objective, that is, inflation control with a concern for developments in the real 
economy.
5 To be sure, the relative weight different central banks place on inflation control 
varies around the world. Yet, monetary policy and the scope of a central bank’s activities are 
effectively interpreted by such indicators as being limited to the performance of inflation and 
output (or the output gap). Such a conclusion is also influenced by the view, supported in 
theory and in practice, that only one instrument is necessary for the central bank to achieve a 
desirable monetary policy outcome.
6 Not surprisingly then, the associated transparency metrics 
reflect pre-existing views about the role of central banks and their policy aims.  
There is much less emphasis in the literature on measuring transparency on an evaluation of 
how central banks communicate their actions, the quality of communication, much less on how 
transparency is managed. Addressing this deficiency means getting a better sense of the variety 
of ‘inputs’ used by the decision-making bodies in central banks, how potential conflicts with the 
fiscal and other governmental authorities (e.g., supervisors of the financial system) are 
managed, the rationale for certain decisions made by the central bank, and the governance 
structures they operate under. There is even less research dealing with transparency issues 
when a central bank must not only manage the conventional requirements of monetary policy 
but must also evince a concern and develop responses to financial stability issues (see, 
however, Born, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher 2010). Although a few authors (e.g., Oosterloo, De 
Haan and Jong-A-Pin 2007) have attempted to analyze and quantify the content of central bank 
financial stability reports (FSRs), a recent innovation in communication published by a growing 
number of central banks, it is telling that the contents of such reports did not, until very 
recently, provide an assessment of the health of the banking system. Moreover, the 
 
5 Alternatively, the central bank may have an exchange rate goal or an objective in terms of a monetary aggregate. 
Nevertheless, the usual aim is to fulfill some primary task for monetary policy without jeopardizing sustainable 
economic growth. 
6 This need not be only an interest rate or the same instrument at all times. Depending on the circumstances (e.g., 
near or at the zero lower bound) central banks may turn to other instruments (e.g., quantitative easing or credit 
easing). At some central banks an exchange rate instrument might be preferred over setting an interest rate. 5 
 
                                                           
information used to be somewhat removed from the type of data, for example, that the IMF 
publishes in its own Global Financial Stability Report. Since the publication of Oosterloo, De 
Haan and Jong-A-Pin (2007) several central banks (e.g., the Reserve Bank of New Zealand) have 
revamped this kind of publication to provide information not only about the health of the 
financial system but to analyze the various threats in the form of systemic risks to the financial 
system.
7 Whether this is sufficient, however, is an entirely different question. Aikman, Haldane, 
and Nelson (2010) find that financial cycles do not coincide with business cycles, either in 
amplitude or frequency. Consequently, when it comes to communicating financial stability 
issues the results suggest “…the need for absolute clarity about the objectives of any macro-
prudential policy framework and the policy rule necessary to deliver them. Any lack of 
transparency or failure of communications is likely to inhibit the effectiveness of macro-
prudential policy…” (op.cit., p. 33). 
“Talking” about stability issues is, of course, not new. What is different is that such 
communication will be undertaken in an environment where governments and the public will 
place greater demands on central banks to achieve multiple outcomes. In turn, this will require 
a better understanding of how monetary policy and financial stability will work together and 
the challenges of meeting goals set out for both tasks. Prior to the global financial crisis, price 
stability was thought to be both necessary and, perhaps, sufficient to ensure financial stability. 
There is considerable evidence that the fundamental belief that this link underscores how 
monetary policy used to be conducted since this view is what frequently came from the mouths 
of central bankers and academics (e.g., Schwartz 1995, Siklos 2009).
8 Indeed, the need to ‘re-
 
7 With the benefit of hindsight, the failure of FSRs to deliver on their promise is evident in the following quote from 
Svensson (2003, pg. 26-7) who welcomed their introduction because this type of publication was meant: “…to 
assure the general public and economic agents that everything is well in the financial sector when this is the case. 
They also serve as early warnings for the agents concerned and for the financial-regulation authorities when 
problems show up at the horizon. Early action can then prevent any financial instability to materialize, keeping the 
probability of future financial instability very low.” 
8 Consider again Svensson (2010) who summarizes this view in the context of how monetary policy is conducted 
under inflation targeting. “The central bank uses all relevant information that has an impact on the forecast of 
inflation and the real economy. In this framework, the central bank takes financial conditions such as credit 
growth, asset prices, imbalances, potential asset price bubbles and so on into account only to the extent that they 
have an impact on the forecast of inflation and resource utilization. Inflation and resource utilization are target 6 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
educate’ the public to the effect that price stability and small output gaps may no longer be 
adequate to ensure financial system stability is itself a communications challenge that is only 
beginning to be tackled by policy makers. 
There is an equally important practical implication for what is expected to be a greater demand 
for simultaneously communicating monetary policy and financial stability issues. One is 
reminded of the Tinbergen principle, seemingly forgotten in a world with a central bank facing a 
single objective, namely that price stability requires only a single instrument, ordinarily an 
interest rate, to attain it.
9  In the changed environment policy makers now face the implications 
of the Tinbergen principle are once again germane to policy design. Tinbergen’s principle states 
that, faced with multiple objectives, one must deploy multiple instruments to achieve them. 
Even if policy makers can agree that an interest rate instrument suffices to deliver price 
stability, the situation is far more complicated in the case of financial system stability where 
there is currently no consensus definition of the term, and still less agreement on the 
constituents of an indicator of the quality of current macro-prudential policies.
10
A second communications challenge facing the monetary authorities is the need to coordinate 
their public pronouncements with other authorities and institutions, both of the domestic and 
international varieties, to ensure that what is communicated to domestic stakeholders is 
consistent with the policy objectives of the central bank, while permitting the monetary 
authority to simultaneously retain a reasonable degree of autonomy. After all, it is far from 
 
variables, that is, variables that the central bank tries to stabilize. Financial conditions are not target variables. 
Instead, they are only indicators, as they provide information to the central bank about the state of the economy, 
the transmission mechanism and exogenous shocks. Financial conditions then affect policy rates only to the extent 
that they have an impact on the forecast of inflation and resource utilization.” 
9 Recall the point made above, namely the refrain from central banks that price stability is the best way to deliver 
other benefits to society in the form of muted business cycle fluctuations and financial stability. 
10 With the possible exception of the fall-back position to do “whatever it takes” as when, for example, the U.S. Fed 
invoked section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act in the midst of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. In the aftermath of 
the financial crisis of 2007-9 the Act has been amended to place some limits on the loans the Fed can made in 
“unusual and exigent” circumstances to require approval by the Secretary of the Treasury, while the Congress can 
also terminate the program.  7 
 
                                                           
obvious that the events of 2007-9 represent a failure of monetary policy as opposed to a failure 
of regulation and supervision. Nevertheless, the presumption is that central banks will have to 
shoulder a considerable fraction of the burdens of post-crisis policy-making.  
The events of April and May 2010 also represent additional evidence of the sheer force of 
financial globalization and the (in)ability of policy makers to communicate their intentions in a 
clear and convincing manner. Indeed, a related challenge is for central banks to explain, 
especially to financial markets, why the concept of central bank independence, and the need 
for fiscal and monetary policies to be coordinated, needs to be more ‘elastic’ over time.
11 That 
is, the monetary authority cannot be above ‘politics’ in extraordinary times. In ordinary times, 
when economic shocks are largely benign, the central bank can afford to be more at arm’s 
length than at other times. Elasticity does not mean abandoning the notion of central bank 
independence. Instead, it requires recognition that the degree to which a central bank operates 
autonomously from the government can, and must be, state dependent. Communicating 
subtleties in the government-central bank relationship is essential and contributes to clarity 
and transparency. Indeed the communications function may have inadvertently been made 
more complicated since some central banks, such as the Federal Reserve and the Bank of 
England, have actually gained enhanced authority in the realm of monetary policy. This may be 
viewed as a surprising outcome in view of worries over loss of autonomy as a consequence of 
the handling of the crisis in it early stages and in contributing to the conditions that produced 
the crisis in the first place. One can reasonably ask whether, having won the battle to maintain 
central bank independence, some central banks may in future lose the war if, and when, the 
next crisis emerges. 
 
11 This may be less difficult than is commonly thought. After all, following a flurry of articles highlighting the 
connection between central bank independence and inflation, we now know that only a few key elements that 
define the relationship between the government and the central bank matter. In particular, the clarity of the 
central bank’s mission or, in the case of less developed economies, the turnover rate of central bank governors 
trumps all other factors. See, for example, Siklos (2002, Chapter 2, and references therein). 8 
 
                                                           
Defining when a particular state of the world is, or is not, ‘extraordinary’, poses a separate 
difficulty for central banks that wish to communicate clearly without unduly upsetting financial 
markets. Needless to say, a related hurdle central banks (and governments) must overcome is 
to explain to the public at large why central bank autonomy is no longer a policy that must be 
rigidly adhered to at all times. While it is clear that all central banks were aware of the risks 
posed by changing public perceptions of their autonomy, whether government interference 
was direct or by stealth, the jury is out on how successful the defense has been. For example, 
while the Fed and the European Central bank (ECB) are viewed by some to have lost some of 
their autonomy in the aftermath of the events of 2007-9, the Bank of England does not appear 
to have suffered the same fate.
12 A root cause then of potential miscarriages of justice when 
times are difficult, with disastrous consequences for a central bank’s standing in the public at 
large, is the failure to articulate principles for the handling of the inevitable conflicts that arise 
between a central bank and the government. Time and time again when fiscal and monetary 
authorities appear to be too close to each other, or on some collision course, this has proved to 
have permanent and deleterious negative consequences for the important position a central 
bank holds in society and it is a lesson from history that, sadly, seems to be repeated over and 
over again (e.g., see Siklos 2002). 
All of these developments also mean that, when it comes to communicating policies, central 
banks will have to guard against the tendency to treat the problem of publicly explaining, say,  
financial stability issues as being ‘complex’. To be sure, the issues are complicated, especially as 
the economics profession is in the midst of rethinking some of its theories about the 
relationship between financial and goods markets and revising the models used for policy 
analysis. However, an unclear or poorly communicated response to the present environment 
can easily fall prey to a new form of opacity, namely portraying the problem as one that is 
difficult or impenetrable only because policy makers have yet to come up with a successful mix 
 
12 As a result, there may well be lessons learned about the future governance structures of central banks since the 
Bank of England was indemnified against losses incurred through its asset purchases. The relevant implications for 
the future shape of central bank legislation are, however, outside the scope of this paper. 9 
 
                                                           
of responses to shocks such as the ones that hit the world economy since the summer of 
2007.
13
How information is communicated, the judgments and processes used in arriving at policy 
decisions are equally important variables economists (and others) need to understand before 
useful proposals to improve communications strategies are developed to deal with the ‘new’ 
realities described above.   
Central bankers have often commented on the role of simple policy rules, the best known one 
of course being the eponymous Taylor rule. Poole (2006), for example, suggests that 
interpreting Fed behavior as akin to following a policy rule is not inaccurate in the sense that 
the rule implies that “…the general contours of FOMC policy are broadly predictable” (op.cit., 
p.6). Many other central banks around the world can make roughly the same claim, at least 
since the mid-1990s. As a result, it may be fairly claimed that the publicity surrounding policy 
rules is one of the communications successes of central banks since the mid-1990s. However, 
neither Poole nor other central bankers would claim that the rule can be safely adhered to at all 
times. Indeed, at the 2009 Jackson Hole Conference, Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of 
Canada, pointedly reminded his audience that “…monetary policy communications could adapt 
to reflect the behavioural dynamics of financial systems. An effective communications strategy 
for normal states may prove counterproductive in exuberant states.” (Carney 2009). Precisely 
because asset prices play a role in real outcomes this study argues that central banks should 
consider adopting hybrid inflation targeting frameworks with a form of price level targeting on 
grounds that such an approach would improve the clarity of monetary policy communications. 
3.  Data and Empirical Evidence 
a.  Data 
 
13 A negative externality over concerns about ‘complexity’ is to propose new forms of regulation that actually end 
up complicating the task of monetary policy thereby throwing up new challenges for communicating policy 
decisions. 10 
 
                                                           
Mahadeva and Sterne (2000, chapter 4) conducted a large survey of central banks in 1998 and 
many of the questions are repeated, while not exactly, by the BIS in a separate survey 
conducted almost a decade later in 2007. Indeed, the BIS has conducted a series of surveys in 
recent years intended to evaluate how central banks communicate. A broad overview of the 
results is contained in BIS (2009).
14 While a large number of questions were posed only a 
relatively small sample of these serve as the starting point for the analysis below or were 
deemed to be directly germane to the issue of communicating monetary policy when the 
central bank is expected also to evince a concern for financial stability. Additional information 
about the surveys is relegated to an appendix. Whereas the survey was conducted across a 
large number of central banks the empirical analysis that follows relies on a sample of, at most, 
30 central banks. Indeed, additional data limitations reduced the effective sample for some of 
the estimates generated to 8 industrial economies. The latter group consists of industrial 
economies alone while the broader set of countries also includes 16 emerging market 
economies. Finally, almost two-thirds of the economies sampled have numerical inflation 
targets. That I am relying in part on unpublished information limits a detailed identification of 
some specific information in the data set. 
Next, I examine the information content of the index of central bank transparency, due to 
Dincer and Eichengreen (2007). The index is an aggregation of 15 attributes that describe the 
type and content of information released by central banks. The 15 attributes are also 
aggregated into five broad categories. They are: political transparency, which measures how 
open the central bank is about its policy objectives; economic transparency, an indicator of the 
type of information used in the conduct of monetary policy; procedural transparency, which 
provides an indication of how monetary policy decisions are made; policy transparency, a 
measure of the content and how promptly decisions are made public by the central bank; and, 
finally, operational transparency, which summarizes how the central bank evaluates its own 
performance. Details about the construction of the index are also relegated to an appendix 
 
14 Also see Filardo and Guinigundo (2008). (also, see Siklos 2010a). Even if everyone can agree that the individual components of the index 
are useful metrics for our understanding about how open central banks are, it is striking that 
certain elements of the index reflect longer term concerns of the central bank while others are 
more suited to an evaluation of how well the central bank is likely to communicate monetary 
policy in the short-term. Thus, for example, since political transparency is geared toward the 
provision of information stemming from the precision of policy objectives and the 
government’s role in setting these objectives, these are likely to change slowly and 
infrequently. The slow moving nature of changes in the values in this category is likely also 
enhanced by the principle ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’. In contrast, attributes included under 
the headings of policy and operational transparency, are focused on the day to day policy 
challenges a central bank is likely to face. As a result, an aggregate indicator of central bank 
transparency is less likely to indicate how well central banks have used their drive to become 
more transparent to calm markets’ fears or in dealing with crisis type situations that directly 
impinge on the conduct of monetary policy. An additional consideration is likely to stem from 
the fact that central banks are apt to copy from each other what ‘works’, prompted also by 
advice from institutions such as the IMF and the BIS. Presumably, they are likely to promote 
what they consider as ‘best standards of practice’ when it comes to monetary policy. 
Since the available dataset is relatively small, and the number of central bank transparency 
attributes that play a role in influencing the goals of financial stability is also likely to be limited, 
one way of addressing the issue empirically is to consider a factor model and effectively extract 
the principal components which can then be related to the variable(s) of interest. This can 
potentially reduce the dimensionality of the problem to a manageable level. Since there are 15 
attributes that make up central bank transparency ( ) we can express the linear combination 




i ε    (1.1)  1 1 15 15 ... ii i Tf f αα =+ + +
The  i f (i=1,…15) are the potential common factors while the  are the factor loadings. 
Specification (1.1) is estimated in such a way so that the factors are orthogonal to each other. If 
ij αwe then specify a proxy for an observable variable that defines financial stability (FS) we can 
empirically assess whether the most important factors, or principal components, play a role in 
the outcome. Following the usual practice (e.g., see Joliffe 1986), only eigenvalues that are 
greater than one are retained.
15 Arguably, it is not levels of transparency achieved by certain 
central banks that may matter as much as how transparency has changed over time. Hence, 
central banks that achieved a high level of transparency early on, which then remains 
unchanged, may have different implications for the balance between price stability and 
financial system stability than for central banks whose transparency is rising quickly over time. 
Finally, as there are data from two separate surveys, one is also able to examine the sensitivity 
of the results to a set of questions more directly related to how central bank communication 
has evolved over time.  Regardless, the preceding calculations lead to the following regression 
specification 
  01 2 it it it i FS Z f u ββ β =+ + +  (1.2) 
In equation (1.2), all the variables were previously defined except for Z which, ideally, is a 
vector of other determinants of the financial system stability proxy. To keep the specification as 
parsimonious as possible, Z is defined according to whether country i had a numerical inflation 
target during the 1998-2007 period examined below while we sequentially consider the various 
available factors extracted on the basis of expression (1.1).
16 Because a time series-cross 
section version of equation (1.2) is also considered, a time subscript (t)  is added. 
It remains then to develop a proxy for financial stability (FS). It has already been pointed out by 
several authors (e.g., Goodhart and Tsomocos 2010) that there is no consensus about how to 
define the term. Even more striking perhaps is that this is an age old problem. For example, 
Crockett (1997, p. 8), former General Manager of the BIS, in the wake of the financial crisis that 
was beginning to grip Asia, asked the questions at the Jackson Hole Symposium that continue to 
                                                            
15 The eigenvalues can be interpreted as the standardized variance associated with each factor. 




be posed today: “What do we mean by financial stability? Why should official intervention (as 
opposed to reliance on market forces) be required to promote stability? And what concrete 
approach can be employed?” Over the years many central banks have had to at least come up 
with an explanation of what they believe financial stability represents. A survey of seven central 
banks of the industrial world included in the empirical work below (not shown; see, however, 
the appendix) suggests some differences persist in views about the meaning of the term. 
Obviously, this potentially complicates the communications problem. However, there exists 
some agreement, more clearly spelled out by some central banks than others, that financial 
system stability represents an ability to withstand a wide variety of shocks such that economic 
performance is not adversely affected. In other words, financial system stability contains an 
element of changes in risks to the central bank being able to fulfill its primary objectives, 
namely either price stability as defined by each central bank, or a dual objective that includes 
some form of sustainable employment.  
Since the definitions leave wide latitude in developing a proxy the present paper consider 
several definitions, themselves partly motivated by various data limitations. For 24 countries, 
including 11 emerging markets, we can evaluate the variance of inflation forecast errors from 
Consensus economics over the 1997Q1-2007Q4 period. A larger variance is assumed to be 
more likely to threaten the twin goals of financial and inflation stability. Similarly, to the extent 
that central banks that have become more transparent are also more likely to set policy 
according to a policy rule, namely the Taylor rule larger deviations from such rules are also 
likely to be seen as a threat to both objectives. For 8 industrial countries, 5 of which possess a 
numerical inflation target, we can also evaluate how much disagreement there is in inflation 
forecasts, again covering a period that excludes the global financial crisis of 2008-9. As noted 
earlier (also see the appendix) a loss of financial system stability reflects the outcome of a 
cumulative process. Hence, if we sum levels of disagreement over time we can gain some idea 
about the extent to which failure by central banks to properly convey the overall state of the 
economy, and whether financial imbalances threaten them. Finally, owing to the role of asset 
price movements in facilitating deleterious outcomes for aggregate economic activity, we also 14 
 
                                                           
proxy FS by evaluating the variance of nominal asset price growth or, alternatively, the variance 
of asset price gaps, based on the aggregate asset price indicator developed by the BIS (e.g., see 
Borio and Lowe 2004). To proxy the gap a Hodrick-Prescott filter with the standard smoothing 
parameter (1600 for quarterly data) is applied to the logarithm of the asset price index.
17  
b.  Suggestive Evidence 
Table 1 provides an overall summary of the finding from the BIS surveys of 2007. Countries that 
qualify as belonging to the industrial or emerging market (EMEs) groups of economies are 
defined according to the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. By 2007 almost two-thirds of all 
economies sampled followed monetary policy objectives focused on inflation control with all 
industrial economies in the same camp. While the fraction of EMEs where inflation was the 
primary objective of monetary policy is slightly higher than in the industrial world, almost 20% 
of central banks in this region followed other objectives such as an exchange rate or a monetary 
target. There is considerably more diversity in who sets the objectives of monetary policy. For 
example, whereas almost a third of central banks in the industrial world set their objectives 
jointly with government the same fraction is far smaller among the EMEs where the central 
bank sets the objective in two-thirds of the sample. These figures are important because the 
constraints felt by a central bank when communicating not only purely monetary issues but also 
 
17 There are many ways, of course, of defining asset price gaps. Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) follow the approach 
of Borio and Lowe (2002) and Adalid and Detken (2007) to define aggregate asset price booms. A house price-
boom is defined as a persistent deviation of real house prices from a smooth trend, calculated via a one-sided HP 
filter with a (high) smoothing parameter of 100,000. A boom is defined as a positive deviation of house prices from 
this smooth trend of more than 5 per cent lasting at least 12 quarters.  In Adalid and Detken (2007) a boom is 
defined as a persistent deviation from an HP trend (with smoothing parameter of 100,000) of more than 10 per 
cent lasting at least 4 quarters. Bordo and Jeanne (2002) focus on the growth rate of asset price series to define 
booms. Detken and Smets (2004) argue that the use of an asset price gap is preferable to the growth rate for 
defining a boom because the price gap allows the concept of accumulated financial imbalances to be stressed – 
reducing the weight of periods of rapid asset price growth directly following an asset price collapse.  It also allows 
sustained periods of only slightly above average growth to cumulate into a boom in levels space. A boom is defined 
where the 3-year (from t-2 to t) moving average growth rate of the (real) asset price exceeds the series average by 
a factor of 1.3 times the series standard deviation. When this condition is met, then a boom is declared in periods 
t-2, t-1 and t.  
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questions that directly relate to financial stability are likely to be dictated in part not only by the 
overall objectives for policy but the procedures in place to revisit and renew the existing 
monetary policy strategy. Next, I consider what the survey says about how monetary policy 
decisions are announced. The results are summarized in Table 2. There is little to distinguish the 
industrial from the EMEs with both newswire and the internet overwhelmingly the means used 
to disseminate such announcements. Far less common are briefings (e.g., press conferences) 
suggesting that prepared statements are the preferred vehicle to communicate with the public. 
If one considers the content of central bank communication, as summarized in table 3, the 
situation is different between the industrial and EMEs. All of the economies in the former group 
provide a rationale as well as comment on both the short-term outlook and risks to that 
outlook. In contrast, central banks in EMEs are far less keen to show their hand about how they 
see the future. One reason, of course, is that EMEs may feel that they are far more susceptible 
to foreign shocks and the uncertainties contained therein than their counterparts in the 
industrial world.  
It is also interesting to consider the objectives of central banks as they pertain to disclosing 
more information to the public, as shown in Table 4. In 70% of central banks, the aim is to 
influence expectations (one would presume, first and foremost, of inflation). Interestingly, a far 
greater fraction of central banks in EMEs rely on the guidance motive than in the industrial 
world. There are some hints in the bottom portion of the table suggesting that monetary 
authorities in the industrial world worry about the loss of flexibility or potential market 
overreaction to the content of policy announcements. Nevertheless, the fraction of central 
banks in EMEs that worry about the same issues is considerably higher suggesting that these 
central banks have reached a slightly different conclusion about the net benefits of greater 
disclosure. It is also worth noting, though the data are insufficiently informative, that central 
banks in the industrial world are not only older and more conservative on this score while the 
EMEs in the sample have only relatively recently enjoyed the freedom to communicate more 
frequently and directly to the public, encouraged by the autonomy they have won from direct 
government interference.  Given the importance attached to some form of forward guidance it 16 
 
is perhaps not surprising, as revealed in Table 5, that the vast majority of central banks around 
the world rely on multiple channels to transmit information to the public. While the press 
release is the favoured vehicle, monetary policy reports, numerical forecasts, as well as 
speeches, all figure prominently as devices to communicate their views.  
If we are to understand how central banks communicate, and the likely effectiveness of this 
communication, it is worth considering the nature of the inputs provided by central bank staff 
and transmitted to senior management who are responsible for making monetary policy 
decisions and publicly communicating them. It is immediately clear from the summary shown in 
Table 6 that central bank officials not only receive frequent assessments and updates, on 
average nine times a year, but also receive projections or forecasts, on average, roughly about 
once every two months. Also, notice that forecasts and risks to such forecasts play a relatively 
larger role in policy meetings at inflation targeting central banks. Since almost all central banks 
make policy announcements at least 8 to 12 times a year this suggests that, at least on average, 
the incidence of new information from forecasts is less frequent than the potential number of 
times a year a change in the policy instrument is contemplated. Clearly, central banks can 
decide to change the policy rate for reasons other than the change in the outlook (e.g., the 
uncertainty about the outlook) and the survey clearly suggests that other factors are also at 
play. Unfortunately, the survey is uninformative about the role played, for example, by changes 
in risks to the future outlook, perceptions of financial imbalances or the threat of a looming 
financial crisis. However, there is potentially another factor at play that has received far less 
discussion in the literature. It is worth highlighting, as demonstrated in Table 7, that almost all 
central banks perceive both the volume and complexity of the information they are required to 
consider as having risen over time. It is quite likely that these considerations weigh on central 
bankers and their ability not only to communicate their views but to express such views in a 
clear and convincing manner. Going forward, central banks and their partners in other agencies, 
and in government, must tackle the problem not only how to define the scope of central bank 
communication but whether increasingly vast amount of information can be communicated 
effectively to markets and the public at large. 17 
 
                                                           
The next two tables (Tables 8 and 9) turn to an attempt to compare the various surveys of 
central bank transparency (e.g., Mahadeva and Sterne 2000, BIS 2009) with the version of the 
same index based on attributes measured from actual information publicly provided by the 
central banks. To facilitate comparisons the Tables consider changes in communication 
activities between 1998 and 2007. The index of central bank transparency begins in 1998 while 
the survey conducted by Mahadeva and Sterne (2000) begins in 1997 and was completed 
roughly by the end of the same year. Hence, we take their data as a reflection of the state of 
play as of the beginning of 1998. In addition, since the two surveys considered here are not 
entirely identical, the calculations provided in Table 8 are based on a selection of questions 
from both surveys that were nearly the same. In contrast, the construction of the index of 
central bank transparency relies on a slightly different format for its contents.
18  
Table 8 confirms the findings based on table 7 since the overall volume of information both 
used and published by central banks has risen and this is just as true for central banks in the 
industrial world as it is in the EMEs. Nevertheless, there are four areas that offer interesting 
contrasts about changes in central bank transparency, at least as measured by survey data. 
First, the role of economic analysis has grown substantially more in importance among central 
banks in the industrial world than elsewhere. On the other hand, projections or forecasts of 
some kind have become a more prominent feature of the work of central banks in EMEs. This is 
not surprising as one of the challenges faced by central banks in the EMEs since the early to mid 
1990s has been to understand and model the transmission mechanisms in their own economies 
as well as build-up a data base capable of generating useful predictions. Third, Table 8 captures 
the shift towards a greater focus on inflation control as well as the lead taken by several central 
banks in the industrial world in this regard, reflected in the finding that almost three quarters of 
central banks in industrial economies (IE) had unchanged monetary policy objectives while 
almost half of their counterparts in the EMEs saw changes in central bank objectives. Finally, it 
is striking that, although 80% of all central banks have increased their emphasis on providing a 
 
18 The appendix provides additional details. 18 
 
public explanation of monetary policy actions, the breakdown by IE and EMEs shows that this is 
overwhelmingly a phenomenon of the advanced economies. As we shall see, this finding may 
well have repercussions for how central banks communicate in future and the role played by 
multilateral agencies such as the G20 in the process. 
Table 9 supports the surveys’ findings about the relatively faster improvements in aggregate 
central bank transparency over the decade from 1998 to 2007. In particular, EMEs have 
adopted a numerical objective for their central banks at a relatively faster pace than their 
counterparts in the industrial world. Other improvements include faster adoption of measures 
to enhance procedural and policy transparency. The evolution of central banks policies in the 
industrial world (Siklos 2002) suggests that this group of economies essentially were ‘first 
movers’. As we shall see, this may also have a role to play in dealing with concerns over 
communicating financial system stability issues.          
I now turn to more formal empirical evidence concerning the role and impact of attempts by 
central banks to improve their transparency and provide effective communications. Table 10 
shows the communality for each of the 15 attributes for the 30 economies that were also 
surveyed by the BIS. Estimates are shown for both the levels and changes in transparency 
attributes as well as for a selection of key questions from the BIS survey. When it comes to 
transparency levels there is considerable common ground across the economies examined 
regarding procedural transparency. This suggests that central banks communicate information 
in a similar manner. There is also, unsurprisingly given some of the summary statistics discussed 
earlier, considerable common ground in the specification of a numerical inflation objective 
(attribute 1b). Finally, a very strong common factor is the provision of an explanation for policy 
rate decisions. Turning to changes in the same attributes over the 1998-2007 period the 
situation is broadly similar with the one reported based on the levels of central bank 
transparency attributes, except that there is more in common across the central banks 
surveyed in the area of political transparency as well a relatively stronger links among the 
economies considered in the area of policy transparency. Since the index of transparency 
effectively represents what’s observed by the public it is useful to contrast this with what 19 
 
                                                           
central banks themselves regard as important features of the inputs that go into the monetary 
policy making process. As shown in the last column of Table 9 there is considerable agreement 
across the economies examined that economic analysis of various kinds, but especially 
projections and forecasts, represent central ingredients in the monetary policy decision-making 
process. There is considerably more diversity about the role of risk factors in influencing the 
setting of monetary policy and still less common ground when it comes to the volume and 
complexity of the information that is provided.  
The upshot of all this is that while each of the attributes that make up the index of central bank 
transparency are interesting in their own right, as is the content of the survey-based analysis, 
the number of ‘factors’ that help define transparency and central bank communication strategy 
can be reduced to a more parsimonious level. Accordingly, Table 11 shows the chosen factor 
loadings themselves estimated by principal components analysis.
19 Although, in principle, the 
identification of each of the components, defined to be orthogonal to each other, is somewhat 
arbitrary we do get some information from the factor loadings which, following (1.1), can be 
viewed as weights in a linear combination of potential common factors. Significant loadings are 
highlighted in bold characters and these serve as guides in defining the factors defined in the 
top row. The factors are listed in order of importance. Hence, according to the principal 
components analysis on the levels of the attributes that make up the central bank transparency 
index, the economic outlook represents the most important factor followed by explanations of 
the policy stance. Information that communicates the monetary policy strategy or provides an 
indication of how central banks reach their decision, that is, their judgment, round out the list 
of most salient factors. The list looks somewhat different when we turn to changes in central 
bank transparency attributes. Now, communicating monetary policy strategy, the stance of 
policy, the nature of shocks hitting the economy, are the most important factors driving 
changes in the components of the index. Communicating policy disagreements within the policy 
 
19 Following standard practice (e.g., see Joliffe 1986) the analysis is restricted to components with eigenvalues 
greater than 1, also known as the Kaiser-Gutmann criterion. The principal components are rescaled since they are 
dependent on the scaling of the variables although in the present context this poses little difficulty given how the 
index of central bank transparency and the survey-based questions are coded. making committee and evaluations of policy outcomes complete the list of factors that matter 
for understanding changes in central bank transparency over time. Finally, if we examine the 
inputs into the policy process, the data uphold the relative importance of projections, economic 
analysis, and a discussion of risks to the outlook. Taken together it does appear that there is 
some consistency between the survey and an independent assessment of central bank 
transparency. What central banks communicate is indeed largely influenced by the importance 
attached to certain inputs that go into the policy making process.  
I now turn to a few regression estimates that may be used to speculate about the contribution 
of transparency and, therefore, central bank communication, on some proxies for ‘financial 
stability’. Previously noted data limitations imply that only two sets of estimates are possible, 
namely one set based on a group of 8 industrial economies and a larger group of 24 economies 
that includes a number of EMEs. There is no consensus on how to define financial system 
stability. Therefore, in line with what central bankers believe are the links between the real and 
financial sectors of the economy the first proxy estimates the variance of inflation forecast 
disagreement (FS1). A convenient way of expressing how much forecasters disagree with each 
other is to evaluate the degree of dispersion across forecasts of the same variable, in the 
present case the rate of change in a Consumer Price Index (CPI). As pointed out recently by 
Leduc, Rudebusch, and Weidner (2009), the concept of forecast disagreement is frequently 
overlooked by observers who track and report on the evolution of the state of the macro-
economy. Unfortunately, there is no universally agreed upon statistic for forecast 
disagreement. Nevertheless, a measure of the dispersion of forecasts is often used to quantify 
forecast disagreement (see Siklos 2010b, and sources therein).
20 Data limitations imply that the 
20 
 
                                                            
20 In the present case Let   represent forecast disagreement at time t, for a forecast of horizon h, produced for 
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 where F is the forecast for inflation, Nj is the number of forecasts, i identifies the forecast, while 
j F represents the 
mean forecast value across forecasters in economy j. For the purposes of the econometric study to follow, forecast period over which forecast disagreement is measured is restricted to the 1999-2007 period and 
only for a group of 8 economies. The original calculations are based on quarterly data and 
simple arithmetic averaging is used to generate the variance measure over the 1999-2007 
period.
21 We exclude the period beginning in 2008 to avoid having the results contaminated by 
the financial crisis (however, I return to this question below).  The next two proxies for financial 
stability (FS2, FS3) take their cue from the work of the BIS (e.g., Borio and Lowe 2004) who have 
highlighted the role of asset price imbalances as instigators of the crisis of 2008-9. Hence, the 
variance of real asset price growth or the variance of deviations in (log) asset prices from an HP 
filtered trend, originally based on quarterly data provided by the BIS, serve as estimates of the 
underlying state of financial stability. The last two proxies for financial stability (FS4, FS5) 
expands the dataset to include a number of EMEs in the sample but at the expense of coarser 
data. FS4 is defined as the variance of inflation forecast errors where forecasts from The 
Economist are used (Siklos 2010c). Next, given the debate over whether departures from the 
Taylor rule are necessary and sufficient to explain the build-up of financial imbalances (e.g., 
Clarida 2010, Taylor 2010, Bernanke 2010), I aggregate the variance of inflation forecast errors 
for the same group of 24 economies and add the variance of deviations from a ‘classic’ Taylor 
rule.
22   Table 12 presents selected results. Owing to the shortage of observations, and making 
use of the orthogonality principle used in constructing the principal components, only principal 
components that were found to be statistically significant are shown. An additional vexing issue 
is whether other ‘controls’ are necessary and which ones to include. Given the construction of 
the dataset it was felt that a dummy variable for whether the economy in question targets 
inflation seemed like a sensible choice. Other controls were also considered but these did not 
21 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
disagreement is first evaluated for each source (i.e., each i in the above equation). The mean value of d is then 
calculated for each economy j in the dataset. 
21 An appendix plots the original data at the quarterly sampling frequency. 
22 In the present case the Taylor rule is defined as  , where  is the inflation gap, and  is the 
output gap. For additional details about sensitivity analysis and the implications of this particular construction, see 
Siklos (2010b). 
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change the conclusions at all.
23  Of the various principal components considered (see Table 
11)
24 only the outcome of policy factor proved to be statistically significant, except when the 
financial stability proxy, defined according to inflation forecast disagreement, is used. In the 
latter case none of the principal components was found to be statistically significant. In 
addition, greater transparency in communicating the outcome of monetary policy measures 
and decisions is found to raise each one of the proxies for financial stability.
25 To the extent 
that more information implies that agents can make more informed judgments this represents 
a little bit of evidence that central bank communication does influence expectations and the 
outlook. However, if the objective of the exercise is to foster greater agreement, then the 
outcome may just as easily be interpreted as signaling a failure in the communication 
strategy.
26 Indeed, if we examine forecasts of the dependent variable for all 30 economies in 
the full dataset, as shown in Figure 2,
27 it is found that there are two possible sources for the 
overall positive impact of the outlook reported in Table 12. First, there is a statistically 
significant and positive impact for 10 EMEs whereas only 5 industrial countries have the same 
impact. For one of the EMEs communicating of the outlook actually reduces the variance of 
 
23 For example, the indicator of regulatory quality from the Polity IV dataset 
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm), as well as the financial regulation quality indicator developed 
by Masciandaro et. al. (2010) were also used and left the conclusions unchanged. 
24 A variety of other principal components were also estimated, for example, based on measures of changes in 
transparency relying on survey-based measures. Space limitations and their lack of significance prevent further 
discussion here.  
25 Further, it did not make a difference whether the economy in question was industrial or an EME. 
26 There are at least two other technical issues that can only be addressed in a very limited fashion. First, it is 
possible that since inflation targeting is a choice variable, there is excessive correlation with the residual term. In 
other words, this variable is endogenous. Limited experimentation reveals, for example, that when FS3 is the 
dependent variable the sign and the significance of the principal component is unchanged. However, owing to the 
paucity of instruments, these are to be considered weak by the standards of the Stock-Yogo test (see Stock, Wright 
and Yogo 2002). Another possibility is that, due to the restricted number of countries in the sample, there is the 
possibility of sample selection bias. Once again, experimentation when FS3 to FS5 are the dependent variables 
suggests no sample selection bias though one should be cautious in drawing the conclusion that there is no sample 
selection bias. 
27 The forecasts for the countries outside the 8 economies are based on incomplete data. 23 
 
                                                           
inflation forecast disagreement. Finally, since we have data for the variance of inflation forecast 
errors for 2008-9 I next consider the following counterfactual. Suppose that the relationship 
between transparency and financial stability is described by the FS3 proxy. To what extent can 
this model explain the variance of inflation forecast disagreement during the 2008-9 period of 
the so-called global financial crisis? As shown in Figure 3 the results suggest, at least for 6 of the 
8 economies in the group of 8 industrial economies considered, that communicating the 
outlook still served a useful function. However, in the case of the UK and US, there is clearly a 
missing element or elements that require an explanation. Of course, the UK and the US, as of 
2009, were at the epicenter of the financial crisis and it is conceivable that no amount of clear 
or frequent central bank communication would have made a difference. In the concluding 
section I reflect on the possibility that central bank transparency and communication, in spite of 
having reached high levels, could stand some improvements that are not immediately obvious 
from either survey results or existing indices of central bank transparency.  
Although the results can only be viewed as speculative, in part due to the severe data 
limitations, one other factor may have played a role in the outcome, namely that most of the 
economies in the group of 8 examined in the first four columns of the table had already 
attained a considerable amount of transparency.
28 Consequently, I consider another 
counterfactual, namely assume that central bank transparency in the 8 economies considered 
in Table 12 changed over the 1998-2007 period at the same rate as in a select group of 8 EMEs 
in the sample. As shown in Table 13, the results change markedly. First, various forms of central 
bank communication unambiguously reduce the financial stability proxy which is taken here as 
implying a rise in financial stability. Second, the timeliness of monetary policy communication, 
as well as information about disagreements within the policy making body, are proximate 
explanations for improvements in financial stability in the hypothetical case considered. 
 
28 Indeed, Dincer and Eichengreen (2007, Table 2) report that 14 countries have aggregate transparency index 
values that are described as ‘extreme’. Seven of the 14 economies in question (not all of them industrial countries) 
are in the dataset examined in this study. Moreover, based on the extension of the dataset from 2007-9,  there are 
no further changes in any of the transparency measures for the 8 economies considered in the regressions in Table 
12 (results not shown; also see Siklos 2010b). 24 
 
                                                           
Conceivably then, prompt reporting and an open acknowledgement of differences in views can 
potentially enhance the role of central bank communication.  
4.  Conclusions and Policy Implications  
At the outset, it might be noted that the data so far collected from central banks, as well as 
some of the data contained in various surveys of central banks, ought to lead to other studies 
related to the general issue of how central banks communicate. For example, forecasting lies at 
the core of central bank activities. Yet, there is considerable divergence of opinions around the 
world not only about what information should be released, how it ought to be communicated, 
but the limits of providing forward-looking type information. Indeed, nowhere is the issue more 
heated than when the question is raised of releasing a forward interest rate track. 
Understanding how different central banks reach different conclusions is also of considerable 
importance and interest. Taking a step back from the specific example of forecasts, an 
additional avenue of future research should investigate why central banks place greater or 
lesser emphasis on certain forms of transparency. Whether this emerges through the kinds of 
publications released, their frequency, the areas of research a central bank promotes, how it 
portrays and communicates the modeling process in public, are just some of the avenues that 
could also be investigated and from which policy implications may be drawn. 
If we are prepared to accept the notion that changing an interest rate instrument is a “heavy-
handed means of dealing with financial sector vulnerabilities, especially if the potential source 
of instability is limited to a particular sector or area of activity” (Murray 2010), and if the 
available macro-prudential instruments remain in short supply, or we cannot agree on them at 




29 “Rather than trying to reduce imbalances using interest rate policy, it may therefore be preferable in many cases 
for central banks to step up communication and issue risk warnings, that need to be backed up by the ‘threat’ of 
macropudential action.” (IMF 2010, p. 24)  25 
 
                                                           
Would a change to a version of a price level target that combines flexible inflation targeting 
with price level targeting solve the communication problem? Consider Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 
displays the evolution of the price level in 9 industrial countries since 1996.
30 Super-imposed on 
each one of the graphs are straight lines representing constant drifts in the price level ranging 
from 0% to 2.5% depending on the economy in question. In a couple of cases, such as Canada 
and the euro area, the 2% drift alone appears to capture quite well the evolution of the price 
level in both economies, a point that has also been made by others (also see Kamenik et.al. 
2008, Ruge-Murcia 2009, Melino 2010; Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin 2010). In other cases, such as 
Sweden which also has a numerical objective of 2% inflation, the 2% drift does a far poorer job 
of tracking prices than, say, a 1% drift whereas for Japan the no drift case appears to 
outperform other drift patterns considered. Finally, for the UK and the US, a 2.5% drift appears 
to do relatively well. While the US does not have a stated numerical objective there is evidence 
that such an implicit target is not too far away from FOMC members’ views about the 
appropriate US inflation rate whereas for the UK it should be noted that, until 2004, the stated 
target range was 1-4% which makes 2.5% the effective inflation target. Given the persistence of 
inflation it may take some time for prices to reach the present goal, exacerbated by the events 
that have taken place since late 2007. Nevertheless, whereas existing research has tended to 
focus on whether central banks effectively targeted a price level with some drift, or indeed 
whether such a policy is optimal, the point here is to suggest that presenting such data provides 
a simple but powerful communication tool for central banks that ultimately aim to offer some 
form of price stability.
31  Carney (2009), Governor of the Bank of Canada, suggests that such a 
hybrid could be used to lean against financial imbalances during extraordinary times, while 
preserving a drift away from an inflation target (say 2%) for as long as necessary until the 
 
30 Two issues are worthy of mention here but beyond the scope of this paper. First, the date of origin for the data 
plotted in Figures 3 and 4 may alter the conclusions below in a very few cases but not for most. Second, there is 
the issue of the appropriate price level for policy. Although the CPI, or a domestic version of it, is employed below 
there is much to be said in favour of communicating policy by relying on a consumption price deflator.  
31 This also raises the question whether there is consensus about what constitutes price stability, especially as the 
quality of price data varies across countries. This issue is also sidestepped here. 26 
 
imbalance is corrected and the economy can return to its price stability objective.   
 
The proposal is not a new one. White (2006, p. 16), former at the Bank for International 
Settlements writing about the need for a new monetary policy framework, argued that central 
banks “…should express publicly their intention to respond to emerging financial imbalances 
even if, occasionally, this leads to an undershooting of near-term inflation targets.” In other 
words, price stability is not enough. Nevertheless, such a policy might also contribute to ‘solving’ 
the vexing problem of the suitable horizon for monetary policy. Consequently, the time horizon 
to achieve the inflation target would become flexible, in recognition of the primacy of the 
inflation objective but not to the exclusion of the imperative of maintaining some form of 
financial stability. Far from complicating the communication task of the central bank, as Kohn 
(2010) claims, it would actually simplify it unless it is far from clear when financial imbalances 
have become large. Indeed, such a policy might also ease the shifting responsibilities over time 
from the central bank to the regulators who could independently concur with the monetary 
authority concerning the state of financial imbalances. Central banks learned in the early 1990s 
that an unchanged policy rate does not imply an unchanged policy stance, resulting in the 
publication of a press release after each decision is made, regardless of the outcome of the 
policy committee meeting. A future role for central banks in a world where macro-prudential 
concerns predominate, and communication by several regulators and supervisors risks 
confusing rather than clarifying the state, say, of financial imbalances, could involve a joint 
press release, at pre-announced intervals, explaining the existing state of affairs and policy 
decisions that are required to prevent the onset of exuberance in the financial sector from 
taking hold. In conclusion it is worth asking whether there are any implications for financial 
imbalances from advocating a hybrid type of inflation targeting regime of the kind mentioned 
earlier. Figure 5 shows for the US, the UK, and Japan, the evolution of a proxy for financial 
imbalances, defined as the cumulative deviations in a trend of aggregate asset prices (right 
hand scale) against deviations in a drifting price level (left hand scale). In both cases the 27 
 
                                                           
correlation is positive and statistically significant.
32 Moreover, if we were to begin the sample in 
1990 the results would remain unchanged. The Japanese case, shown for a longer sample in 
view of the widely studied Japanese macroeconomic experience since the early 1990s, also 
points to another concern for policy makers. Not only do imbalances in asset prices remain 
negative but, if one assumes even a 1% drift in the price level, deviations from the 1% drift 
become more negative over time. Since the UK and the US were earlier seen as two of the 
‘outliers’ in the sample there is a little bit of evidence supporting some connection between 
these imbalances and developments in consumer prices. Japan, as many others have previously 
noted, is not an example to emulate and Figure 5 supports this view. Clearly, other factors are 
also at play and this also provides additional incentive for the publication of a joint press 
release by regulators and central banks.     
     
 
32 The correlation is 0.31 for the UK (0.40 if the data are extended to 1990), and 0.26 for the US (0.31 if the sample 
starts in 1990). The correlation is statistically insignificant for all the other economies considered in the 1996-2009 
period. However, if we were to extend the data back to 1990 there is a positive correlation found for Australia 
(0.32), while a negative correlation (-0.32) is found for Switzerland. Note that Switzerland’s experience comes 
closest to that of Japan where the correlation is also negative (-0.31) but not statistically significant. 28 
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Table 1 Overview: the Objectives of Monetary Policy and Monetary Policy Decisions, 2007 
 
All economies  Industrial  Emerging markets  Objectives of Monetary 
Policy  % 
Inflation  61 54 67 
Exchange rate  6  0  11 
Monetary  aggregate  3 0 6 
Who defines the target?   
Government 16  8  22 
Central  Bank  35 15 50 
Joint  23 31 17 
Who Announces 
changes to MP 
Objectives? 
 
Government 13  8  17 
Central  Bank  45 15 67 
Joint  19 31 11 
 
Table 2 Communication of Policy Announcements, 2007 
All economies  Industrial  Emerging markets  Outlet 
% 
Newswire  81 92 72 
Internet  84 85 83 
Briefing  13 15 11 
 
Table 3 The Content of Communication of Policy Setting Changes, 2007 
 
All economies  Industrial  Emerging markets  Type of Content 
% of respondents who answer ‘always’ 
Rationale 94  100  89 
Future direction of 
policy 
16 31  6 
Short-term  outlook  68 92 50 
Risks to the outlook  65  85  50 
 
 
Notes to Tables 1 to 3: Based on the BIS’s survey (see BIS 2009). % of all economies surveyed shown. 
Definition for industrial and emerging markets follows IMF definition.  33 
 
Table 4 The Objectives of Greater Disclosure, 2007 
 
All economies  Industrial   Emerging markets  Objectives 
% of respondents who answer ‘very important’ 
Expectations  guidance  70 50 83 
  % of respondents who answer ‘very important’ 
[% who answer ‘somewhat to important’] 























Table 5 The Channels of Central Bank Communication  
and their Role in Influencing Expectations, 2007 
All economies  Industrial  Emerging markets  Channels 
% of respondents who answer ‘very important’ 
Press  release  87 83 89 
Forecasts    73 83 67 
Monetary policy reports  80  92  72 
speeches  70 75 67 
 




Table 6 Staff Input Into the Monetary Policy Process, 2007 
All economies  Industrial  Emerging markets   
Mean (S.D.) of annual frequency 
Current economic 
situation 
Unadjusted: 11.5 (9.7) 















Projection/Forecast  5.50 (2.86)  4.90 (1.97)  6.05 (3.50) 
  % of respondents who answered ‘significant focus of MPC meeting’ 
Discussion of risks to 
forecast 
94.4 58.8 41.2 
Of which:  
Inflation targeters 
- 80  57 
 
Table 7 Volume and Complexity of Monetary Policy Process, 2007 
 All  economies 
% of respondents who answered ‘increasing’ 
Volume of background material  94.1 
Technical content of discussion  85.7 
 
Notes to Tables 6 and 7: See notes to Tables 1 to 3.35 
 
 
Table 8 Changes in Central Bank Transparency, Survey-Based: 1998-2007 
All economies 
 Analysis  Projections  Objective  Assignment  Rationale  Outlook  Risks 
Reduced 5.26  5.26  7.14  14.29  4.00  12.50  13.04 
Increased 78.95  31.58  57.14  14.29  80.00  54.17 21.74 
Unchanged 15.79  63.16  25  71.43  16.00  33.33  65.21 
No. CB  19  19  28  28  25  24  23 
Industrial 
 Analysis  Projections  Objective  Assignment  Rationale  Outlook  Risks 
Reduced 0  9.09  0  14.29  0  16.66  16.67 
Increased 100  72.73  28.57  14.29  15.38 58.33  56.67 
Unchanged 0  18.18  71.43  71.43  84.62  25 16.67 
No. CB  11  11  14  14  13  12  12 
Emerging Market Economies 
 Analysis  Projections  Objective  Assignment  Rationale  Outlook  Risks 
Reduced 12.50  0  14.29  14.29  8.33  8.33  9.09 
Increased 50.00  50  42.86  71.42  16.67  41.66 63.63 
Unchanged 37.50  50  42.86  14.29  75  50  27.27 
No. CB  8  8  14  14  12  12  11 
 
Notes: See the appendix for details about the structure and content of the survey. Based on the 
differences in the scores obtained from the BIS (2009) survey for 2007, and the survey conducted by 
Mahadeva and Sterne (2000).  Shows the percent of central banks surveyed which saw a rise, fall, or no 
change in the attributes listed in the first row. The sum of ‘reduced’, ‘increased’, and ‘unchanged’ in 
each portion of the table should add to 100% though there may be a small rounding error.36 
 
Table 9 Changes in Central Bank Transparency, Index-Based 1998-2007 
Attributes All  Industrial Emerging  Markets 
  Political transparency 
Formal objective?  .01  .01  .01 
Quantification of objective?  .03  .01  .04 
Instrument independence? .01  .01  .01 
  Economic transparency 
Data availability?  .01  .01  .02 
Model disclosure?  .04  .05  .03 
Forecasts published?  .05  .03  .07 
  Procedural transparency 
Strategy outlined?  .01  .01  .02 
Account of deliberations?  .02  .01  .03 
Disclosure of monetary policy 
decision process? 
.01 .01  .01 
  Policy transparency 
Prompt announcement of 
policy rate decision? 
.04 .02  .06 
Explanation of decision?  .03  .04  .03 
Disclosure of policy 
inclination? 
.01 .02  0 
  Operational transparency 
Evaluation of policy target?  .02  .01  .03 
Disclosure of 
shocks/disturbances? 
.02 .01  .03 
Evaluation of policy 
outcomes? 
.02 .01  .03 
Overall transparency index  .33  .25  .40 
Notes: Details about the attributes can be found in the appendix. The values represent the 
average annual change in the attributes listed in the first column. Each attribute receives a 
score of between 0 and 1. The aggregate transparency index reaches a maximum at 15. 37 
 
Table 10 Factor Loadings and Communality 
Level 
Attribute 





1a  0.08  1a  0.71  C11  0.46 
1b  0.79  1b  0.83  C110  0.92 
1c  0.40  1c  0.93  C111  1.00 
2a  0.42  2a  0.65  C12  0.90 
2b  0.48  2b  0.16  C13  1.00 
2c  1.00  2c  0.51  C14  0.70 
3a  0.86  3a  0.09  C15  0.56 
3b  0.70  3b  0.56  C16  0.44 
3c  0.98  3c  0.86  C17  0.58 
4a  0.63  4a  0.90  C31  0.64 
4b  0.98  4b  1.00  C32  0.28 
4c  0.69  4c  0.72  E1  0.22 
5a  0.31  5a  0.48  E15  0.14 
5b  0.37  5b  1.00  E19  0.43 
5c  0.25  5c  0.54 NA  NA 
Note: Attributes consist of the 15 components of the index of central bank transparency (columns (1) and (3)) or selected questions from the BIS survey. See the text and the appendix for details.38 
 
 
Table 11 Factor Loadings 
Level 
Attribute 
Outlook Stance Strategy Judgment  Change 
Attribute 
Strategy Stance Shocks Timely  Dis.  Outcome Survey-
based 
Forecast Analysis Risks 
1a  0.20 -0.04 0.18  -0.06  1a  0.77  0.11 0.21 0.03  -0.16 -0.16  C11  0.32 -0.07  0.59 
1b  0.42 -0.03 0.73  -0.28  1b  0.60 0.52  0.07 0.07  -0.09  0.43  C110  0.84  -0.27 0.38 
1c  0.44 0.04 0.43  -0.15  1c  0.94  -0.11 0.00  0.00 -0.15 -0.08  C111  0.94  0.33 0.00 
2a  0.19 0.56 0.17  -0.18  2a  0.04 -0.02  0.40 0.47  0.43 0.29  C12  0.55  0.77  -0.07 
2b  0.15 0.51 0.44  0.03  2b  -0.13 -0.05 0.04 0.09 0.35 -0.09  C13  0.57  0.83  0.00 
2c  1.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  2c  0.06 0.46  0.53  -0.09  -0.04  -0.01  C14  0.47  0.69  -0.04 
3a  0.38 -0.03 0.75  -0.38  3a  0.11 0.16  -0.09  -0.05  0.16 0.13  C15  0.58 0.22  0.42 
3b  0.26 0.39 0.38  0.58  3b  0.17 0.50  -0.05  0.06  0.50  0.15  C16  0.62 0.02  0.23 
3c  0.51 0.54 0.05  0.65  3c  0.58 -0.29  0.21 0.06  0.62  -0.03  C17  0.50 0.24  0.52 
4a  0.45 0.55 0.19  -0.30  4a  0.09 0.69  0.24 0.52  0.19  -0.21  C31  0.31 0.33  0.66 
4b  0.36  0.83  -0.06 -0.40  4b  0.00 0.00  0.06 1.00  0.00 0.00  C32  0.34 -0.08  0.39 
4c  0.29  0.64  -0.11 0.42  4c  0.13  -0.71  0.03 0.39  0.16 0.12  E1  0.21 0.22  0.36 
5a  0.18 0.41 0.32  -0.05  5a  0.21 -0.01  -0.05 0.20  -0.36 0.52  E15  0.31 0.17  0.10 
5b  0.52 0.10 0.31  0.07  5b  0.00 0.00  0.98  -0.18 0.00  0.00  E19  -0.24 -0.06  0.61 
5c  0.30 0.02 0.27  0.30  5c  -0.04 0.08 0.50 -0.09  0.22 0.48  NA  NA  NA  NA 
Note: See the appendix for an explanation of the attributes, Table 10 and the text for estimation details.Table 12 Regression Results 
 
 Dependent  variables 
Ind. 
Variable 



































Obs. 8 8 8 24 24 
2 R   0.26 0.50 0.66 0.28  0.28 











Note: IT is an inflation targeting dummy (see the appendix for the details). Standard errors in 
parenthesis. *, ** mean statistically significant at the 1 and 5% levels, respectively. The other 
independent variable is based on the principal components reported in Table 11. FS1 to FS5 are 
the various proxies for financial stability described in the text. All equations estimated via OLS. 
Table A5 (appendix) and Siklos (2010c) provide the dates for IT. FS1= variance of forecast 
disagreement. The latter is defined in n. 20. Also, see Siklos (2010b). FS2= variance of the 
growth rate of aggregate asset prices (BIS index), FS3= variance of asset price gaps, as defined 
in the text. FS4= variance of inflation forecast errors, 1999-2007, inclusive. See Siklos (2010c). 
FS5= FS4 +  variance of deviations from a classic Taylor rule, as defined in n. 22. The 8 countries 
in the first three columns are: Australia, Canada, the euro area, New Zealand, Sweden, 
Switzerland, U.K., and USA. The remaining 16 economies added in columns 4 and 5 of the 
results are: Argentina, Chile, Czech R., Hong Kong, Hungary, Israel, Korea (South), Malaysia, 
Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, and Thailand.
39 
  
Table 13 Counterfactuals 
 



























Obs. 8  Obs.  8  8 
2 R   0.34  2 R   0.46 0.45 
F (p)  2.85 
(0.15) 






Note: See notes to Table 12. The counterfactuals are described in the text and involve replacing 
actual changes in transparency in the 8 industrial countries considered with the values obtained 
for 8 EMEs in the sample. 
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larger that 25bp reduction 0 to 25 bp reduction
unchanged 0 to 25 bp rise




























































































































Note: The vertical axis is the fraction of policy rate changes, in percent, in the ranges shown. 
The top and bottom bars represent changes that exceed 25 basis points. See individual central 
bank websites for details of each economy’s official policy rate (e.g., fed funds rate for the U.S.). 







































Note: The left hand side is the financial stability proxy described in the text. EME stands for 
emerging market economy, IC stands for industrial economy. See the appendix for the 
















































Financial stability proxy forecast Financial stability 2008-2009








Note: The vertical axis is the logarithm of the price level proxied via the CPI. Data are from the International Financial Statistics CD-
ROM (October 2010). The straight lines represent constant 0% to 2.5% increases in the price level.  
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Note: Cumulative imbalances represent the sum of deviations of the log of the BIS’s aggregate asset price index 
from an H-P filtered log index value. Price level deviations represent the difference between the (log) of the price 
level and a drift in the price level indicated on the vertical axis.   
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 Appendix I : Survey Questions Used 
A.  Communication of Monetary Policy Results (BIS 2009)
1 
2a: What is the objective in Q1: the intermediate objective or target of monetary policy 
2b: Who defines this objective or target? 
2c: Who announces changes to this objective or target?  
5b: Where are decisions about changes to policy settings first publicly announced  
6: Please indicate what other information the central bank discloses at or around the same time 
that decisions about changes to policy settings are announced and whether this information 
accompanies every policy decision or only some decisions.  
6a 1. Reason for decision 
6a 3. Likely direction of future changes in policy settings 
6a 5. Short-term outlook for the economy 
6a 6. Possible risks to the outlook for the economy 
25a: Reasons for increasing disclosure 
25a 7.Guide market particpants' expectations 
25b 1. Minimise constraints on future policy decisions 
25b 5. Minimise the risk of over-reaction by market participants, eg due to 
misinterpretation 
25b 8. Avoid damage to credibility that could result from disclosing views about future 
developments that might be proven wrong 
27: How important are each of the following communication channels for guiding market 
participants' expectations?  
27 1. Press release announcing the policy decision 
27 4 Central bank forecasts of key economic variables 
27 5.Regular reports, eg monetary policy report 
27 6. Speeches by central bank officials 
 
 
                                                       
1 Access to survey data was provided under an arrangement that prevents attribution or identification of individual 
country information, in view of the unpublished nature of the surveys.  
 
B.  Provision of Monetary Policy Advice to Boards (BIS 2009)
2 
C1 Staff information and analysis provided as input into the policy decision-making process  
C1.1 Historical data set of economic and financial indicators 
C1.2 Chart pack of economic and financial indicators 
C1.3 Analysis of recent data/current economic situation 
C1.4 Analysis of recent financial market developments 
C1.5 A central staff projection or forecast 
C1.6 Alternative projection(s) or forecast(s) 
C1.7 Assessment and analysis of risks 
C1.10 Private sector macro forecasts (e.g. individual, summarised, consensus) 
C1.11 Market expectations for policy adjustment (e.g. surveys, implied from market 
prices), and/or analysis of likely reactions 
C3 Assessment of analysis and risks to the forecast:  
C3.1 Often a significant focus of discussion at MPC meeting? 
C3.2 Generalised standard distributions of shocks, model calibrations:Provided as 
background material for the  decision-making meeting on a reasonably regular basis? 
E1 Impact of changes in the process of providing policy analysis and advice in the last 
few years 
E1.1 The volume of background material 
E1.5 the number of alternative scenarios considered 
E1.9 The technical content of the discussion 
Summary 
•  Conducted In 2007 
•  16 industrial, 20 emerging market economies participating. 
 
 
C.  Mahadeva and Sterne (2000, Chapter 7, Appendix I)  
Question equivalent to 2a (section A above), Table A1, rows 1 to 4; 
Question equivalent to 2b (section A above), “Government role in setting any target?”, 
Table A6, row 2; 
Question equivalent to 6a1 (section A above), “Explanation on day policy changed?”, 
Table A7; 
                                                       
2 Access to survey data was provided under an arrangement that prevents attribution or identification of individual 
country information, in view of the unpublished nature of the surveys. Question equivalent to 6a5 (section A above), “Forward looking analysis on bulletins?”, 
Table A7; 
Question equivalent to 6a6 (section A above), “Risks to forecasts published”, Table A7; 
Question equivalent to C1.10 and C1.11 (section B above), “Analysis of expectations”, 
Table A9; 
Question equivalent to C1.4 (section B above), “Weighted score for explanation of 
policy”, Table A8; 
Question equivalent to C1.5 (section B above), “Forecasting and simulation methods”, 
Table A10. 
  
D.  Index of Central Bank Transparency (Dincer and Eichengreen 2007, Siklos 2010a) 
This appendix describes the construction of the transparency index. The index is the sum 
of the scores for answers to the fifteen questions below (min = 0, max = 15). 
 
1.  Political Transparency 
 
Political transparency refers to openness about policy objectives. This comprises a 
formal statement of objectives, including an explicit prioritization in case of multiple 
goals, a quantification of the primary objective(s), and explicit institutional arrangements. 
(a) Is there a formal statement of the objective(s) of monetary policy, with an explicit 
prioritization in case of multiple objectives? 
No formal objective(s) = 0. 
Multiple objectives without prioritization = 1/2. 
One primary objective, or multiple objectives with explicit priority = 1. 
(b) Is there a quantification of the primary objective(s)? 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
(c) Are there explicit contacts or other similar institutional arrangements between the 
monetary authorities and the government? 
No central bank contracts or other institutional arrangements = 0. 
Central bank without explicit instrument independence or contract = 1/2. 
Central bank with explicit instrument independence or central bank contract 
although possibly subject to an explicit override procedure = 1. 
 
2.  Economic Transparency 
 
Economic transparency focuses on the economic information that is used for 
monetary policy. This includes economic data, the model of the economy that the central 
bank employs to construct forecasts or evaluate the impact of its decisions, and the 
internal forecasts (model based or judgmental) that the central bank relies on. 
(a) Is the basic economic data relevant for the conduct of monetary policy publicly available? (The focus is on the following five variables: money supply, inflation, GDP, 
unemployment rate and capacity utilization.) 
Quarterly time series for at most two out of the five variables = 0. 
Quarterly time series for three or four out of the five variables = 1/2. 
Quarterly time series for all five variables = 1. 
(b) Does the central bank disclose the macroeconomic model(s) it uses for policy 
analysis? 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
(c) Does the central bank regularly publish its own macroeconomic forecasts? 
No numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output = 0. 
Numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and/or output published at less than 
quarterly frequency = 1/2. 
Quarterly numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output for the 
medium term (one to two years ahead), specifying the assumptions about the policy 
instrument (conditional or unconditional forecasts) = 1. 
 
3.  Procedural Transparency 
 
Procedural transparency is about the way monetary policy decisions are taken. 
(a) Does the central bank provide an explicit policy rule or strategy that describes its 
monetary policy framework? 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
(b) Does the central bank give a comprehensive account of policy deliberations (or 
explanations in case of a single central banker) within a reasonable amount of time? 
No or only after a substantial lag (more than eight weeks) = 0. 
Yes, comprehensive minutes (although not necessarily verbatim or attributed) or 
explanations (in case of a single central banker), including a discussion of backward and 
forward-looking arguments = 1. 
(c) Does the central bank disclose how each decision on the level of its main operating 
instrument or target was reached? 
No voting records, or only after substantial lag (more than eight weeks) = 0. 
Non-attributed voting records = 1/2. 
Individual voting records, or decision by single central banker = 1. 
 
4.  Policy Transparency 
 
Policy transparency means prompt disclosure of policy decisions, together with an 
explanation of the decision, and an explicit policy inclination or indication of likely 
future policy actions. 
(a) Are decisions about adjustments to the main operating instrument or target announced 
promptly? No or only after the day of implementation = 0. 
Yes, on the day of implementation = 1. 
(b) Does the central bank provide an explanation when it announces policy decisions? 
No = 0. 
Yes, when policy decisions change, or only superficially = 1/2. 
Yes, always and including forwarding-looking assessments = 1. 
(c) Does the central bank disclose an explicit policy inclination after every policy 
meeting or an explicit indication of likely future policy actions (at least quarterly)? 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
 
5.  Operational Transparency 
 
Operational transparency concerns the implementation of the central bank’s 
policy actions. It involves a discussion of control errors in achieving operating targets and 
(unanticipated) macroeconomic disturbances that affect the transmission of monetary 
policy. Furthermore, the evaluation of the macroeconomic outcomes of monetary policy 
in light of its objectives is included here as well. 
(a) Does the central bank regularly evaluate to what extent its main policy operating 
targets (if any) have been achieved? 
No or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0. 
Yes but without providing explanations for significant deviations = 1/2. 
Yes, accounting for significant deviations from target (if any); or, (nearly) perfect 
control over main operating instrument/target = 1. 
(b) Does the central bank regularly provide information on (unanticipated) 
macroeconomic disturbances that affect the policy transmission process? 
No or not very often = 0. 
Yes but only through short-term forecasts or analysis of current macroeconomic 
developments (at least quarterly) = 1/2. 
Yes including a discussion of past forecast errors (at least annually) = 1. 
(c) Does the central bank regularly provide an evaluation of the policy outcome in light 
of its macroeconomic objectives? 
No or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0. 
Yes but superficially = 1/2. 
Yes, with an explicit account of the contribution of monetary policy in meeting 
the objectives = 1. 
 
Source: Dincer and Eichengreen (2007), Appendix. 
 APPENDIX I 
The Financial Stability Objective 
European Central Bank 
“…a condition whereby the financial system is able to withstand shocks without giving way to 
cumulative processes, which impair the allocation of savings to investment opportunities and 
the processing of payments in the economy.” 




“It is worth emphasizing that the Federal Reserve’s concern with financial stability stems largely 
from the adverse implications of financial instability for overall economic performance. The 
Fed’s interest in promoting financial stability is thus intimately connected with its 
macroeconomic objectives: maximum sustainable employment and price stability.” 
Warsh, K. (2007), “Financial Stability and the Federal Reserve”, remarks delivered the New York 
State Economic Association Annual Conference, October 5.  
 
Bank of England 
“The Bank has a statutory objective to ‘contribute to protecting and enhancing the stability of 
the financial systems of the United Kingdom.’ The Bank does this through its risk assessment 
and risk reduction work, market intelligence functions, payment systems oversight, banking and 
market operations, including, in exceptional circumstances, by acting as a lender of last resort, 
and resolution work to deal with distressed banks.” 
From http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/index.htm  
 
“… to avoid the type of boom and bust cycle in the supply of credit and liquidity that has 
marked the recent financial crisis.” 
From “The Role of Macroprudential Policy”, Bank of England discussion paper, November 2009. 
 
Riksbank 
“…to promote a safe and efficient payment system. …detect changes and vulnerabilities that 
could lead to a serious crisis. the major Swedish banks have particular significance in the 
analysis.” 




 Bank of Canada 
“In Canada, the Bank shares the responsibility for financial stability at the federal level with 
three other entities—the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, the Canada 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Department of Finance. Various provincial bodies also 
play an important role. 
The Bank focuses its attention mainly on macro financial stability issues, leaving the principal 
responsibility for micro issues to the other entities. The Bank's overriding concern is to ensure 
that the financial system is sound and that it works efficiently. In this context, we provide 
liquidity to the system, in both ordinary and extraordinary situations. We give policy advice to 
the federal government on the design and development of the financial system. Through our 
oversight of major clearing and settlement systems, we act to make sure that the failure of a 
participant does not lead to domino effects and to generalized instability. And we provide 
banking services to these systems and to their participants. Finally, we collaborate with other 
domestic and international bodies that work on financial-stability issues.” 
From Dodge, D. (2001), “The Bank of Canada and Financial Stability”, remarks to the Montreal 
Society of Financial Analysts, March 20. 
 
“Financial system stability is the capacity of the financial system of the financial system to do its 
job under a wider range of circumstances. … because the financial system provides channels 
through which savings become investments, money and financial claims are transferred and 
settled, and risk is allocated to those most willing and able to bear it.” 
From Duguay, P. (2009), “Financial Stability Through Sound Risk Management”, remarks to the 
Risk Management Association, Toronto chapter, 8 January. 
Swiss National Bank 
“A stable financial system can be defined as a system whose individual components – financial 
intermediaries and the financial market infrastructure – fulfill the responsibilities functions and 
prove resistant to potential shocks.” 
From http://www.snb.ch/en/about/finstab  
  
Bank of Japan (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/release/zuiji/kako02/fss9905a.htm)  
 
One of the objectives of the Bank of Japan, as stipulated in Article 1 of the Bank of Japan Law, is 
"to ensure the smooth settlement of funds among banks and other financial institutions, 
thereby contributing to the maintenance of an orderly financial system." 
The Bank of Japan has made decisions in view of the following four principles: 
1) there must be a strong likelihood that systemic risk may materialize; 
2) there must be no alternative to the provision of central bank funds; 3) all responsible parties are required to take clear responsibility to avoid moral hazard; and 
4) the financial soundness of the Bank of Japan should not be impaired. 
The Bank has taken efforts to disseminate information on these principles so that the public 
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3.  Additional Tables 
Table A1 Components of Uncertainty, 1997.1-2007.4 
Economy 







Variance – TR 
deviations 
ARG 7.34  126.95  1.39  261.36 
AUS 2.64  1.62  1.76  4.22 
CAD 0.23  0.67  0.13  2.84 
CHI 0.41  3.80  1.46  6.48 
CZE 1.78  7.10  1.78  9.46 
EUR 0.07  0.61  -0.17  1.32 
HKG 10.18  6.46  3.47  24.57 
HUN 1.65  4.97  2.28  8.13 
ISR 4.73  6.12  5.44  17.74 
KOR 1.53  3.82  2.08  12.51 
MAL 0.80  3.33  -0.22  2.43 
MEX 1.48  5.35  3.73  7.86 
NZD 0.64  1.19  2.28  1.97 
NOR 0.23  2.49  2.21  4.75 
PHI 3.44  8.71  3.86  8.03 
POL 3.19  4.99  9.87  35.11 
SIN 2.30  4.30  0.66  4.09 
SLK 17.89  3.81  -3.28  5.23 
SAF 1.29  12.04  5.51  15.14 
SWE 2.02  1.25  0.98  2.37 
SWI 3.18  0.70  -0.41  0.92 
THA 0.68  8.71  -2.23  3.56 
GBR 0.93  0.94  0.98  2.78 
USA 0.86  1.09  -0.42  3.36 
 
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data in Siklos (2010b), and Siklos (2010c). 








Variance Mean  DIS 
2008-09 
Variance 
AUS  3.47 1.48 0.10 0.01  0.19 0.02 
CAD  0.32 0.21 0.01 0.0001  0.03 0.0002 
EUR  0.39 0.10 0.01 0.0003  0.01 0.0002 
NZD  1.44 0.27 0.04 0.001  0.03 0.0004 
SWE  0.34 0.15 0.01 0.0001  0.02 0.0003 
SWI  0.18 0.14 0.01 0.00002  0.02 0.0004 
GBR  0.27 0.21 0.01 0.00004  0.03 0.0006 
USA  0.40 0.61 0.01 0.00012  0.08 0.0006 
 
Source: Siklos (2010b) 
 
Table A3 Variance of (real) BIS Asset Price index 
Economy 1999-2007  2008-2009 
  GROWTH HP  GAP GROWTH HP  GAP 
AUS 29.16  16.91  577  18.98 
CAD 9.23  5.45  116.04  36.56 
EUR 9.41  5.27  16.50  4.71 
NZD 42.67  26.13  30.98  9.97 
SWE 4.79  6.01  12.19  7.24 
SWI 2.34  2.56  54.86  31.58 
GBR 19.81  8.54  392.42  138.53 
USA 30.81  19.97  523.91  146.65 
 
Source: Siklos (2010b)  
Table A4 Changes in Regulatory Quality, 2008-1998 
 
 All  Industrial  Emerging  Markets 
  2007-1998 
Reduced  36.67 35.71 37.50 
Increased 3.33  0  0 
Unchanged  60.00 64.29 62.50 
No.  CB  30 14 16 
  2008-2007 
Reduced 6.67  35.71  18.75 
Increased  0 0 0 
Unchanged  63.33 64.29 81.25 
No.  CB  30 14 16 
 
Source: Calculations based on World Bank Governance Indicator data. See 







Australia  93.2 
Canada  91.1 




Norway+  01.1 





Brazil  99.2 
Chile  90.3 
Mexico  99.1 
South Africa  00.1 
Czech R.  98.1 
Hungary  01.1 
Poland  98.4 
Israel  92.1 
Philippines  02.1 
Thailand  00.2 
Turkey  02.1 Table A6 Correlation of Central Bank Transparency Attributes, Mean 1998-2007 
 
Correlation               
t-Statistic               
Prob.  Q1A Q1B Q1C Q2A Q2B Q2C Q3A Q3B Q3C Q4A Q4B Q4C Q5A Q5B Q5C
Q   1 A0 0 1 .                 
 -----                  
 -----                  
                
Q   1 B2 5 0 0 0 .   1 .                
 1.35  -----                 
 0.19  -----                 
                
Q1C  0.41  0.53  1.00              
 2.38  3.32  -----                
 0.02  0.00  -----                
                
Q2A  -0.16  0.27  0.17  1.00             
  -0.86  1.46  0.92  -----               
 0.40  0.16  0.37  -----               
                
Q2B  0.06  0.42  0.20  0.29  1.00           
 0.34  2.43  1.09  1.58  -----            
 0.74  0.02  0.28  0.12  -----            
                
Q2C  0.20  0.42  0.44  0.19  0.15 1.00          
 1.07  2.45  2.61  1.03  0.78 -----           
 0.29  0.02  0.01  0.31  0.44 -----           
                
Q3A  0.16  0.82  0.52  0.24  0.36 0.38 1.00         
 0.86  7.58  3.26  1.31  2.07 2.17 -----          
 0.39  0.00  0.00  0.20  0.05 0.04 -----          
                
Q3B  0.09 0.24 0.26 0.21 0.40 0.26 0.13 1.00              
  0.48 1.31 1.44 1.12 2.31 1.45 0.72 -----               
  0.64 0.20 0.16 0.27 0.03 0.16 0.48 -----               
                Q3C  0.05 0.05 0.17 0.29 0.39 0.51 -0.04 0.74 1.00            
  0.24 0.26 0.90 1.61 2.24 3.14 -0.19 5.85 -----             
  0.81 0.80 0.37 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.85 0.00 -----             
                
Q4A  0.15 0.34 0.43 0.61 0.35 0.45 0.43 0.25 0.34 1.00          
  0.81 1.92 2.54 4.12 2.00 2.67 2.51 1.34 1.93 -----           
  0.42 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.06 -----           
                
Q4B  0.05 0.20 0.23 0.60 0.44 0.36 0.22 0.17 0.36 0.72 1.00        
  0.27 1.08 1.23 3.93 2.63 2.01 1.19 0.91 2.05 5.55 -----          
  0.79 0.29 0.23 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.24 0.37 0.05 0.00 -----          
                
Q4C  -0.07  -0.10 0.00 0.34 0.37 0.29 -0.15 0.52 0.76 0.25 0.48 1.00      
  -0.37  -0.51 0.02 1.92 2.14 1.62 -0.78 3.18 6.24 1.36 2.87 -----       
  0.71 0.62 0.99 0.07 0.04 0.12 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.01 -----       
                
Q5A  0.25 0.32 0.19 0.36 0.28 0.18 0.36 0.23 0.30 0.26 0.41 0.37 1.00    
  1.35 1.78 1.04 2.07 1.56 0.97 2.04 1.23 1.66 1.41 2.35 2.11 -----     
  0.19 0.09 0.31 0.05 0.13 0.34 0.05 0.23 0.11 0.17 0.03 0.04 -----     
                
Q5B  0.34 0.32 0.35 0.33 0.24 0.52 0.42 0.34 0.38 0.42 0.22 0.10 0.27 1.00  
  1.91 1.77 2.00 1.84 1.31 3.18 2.46 1.90 2.17 2.43 1.19 0.51 1.48 -----   
  0.07 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.20 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.24 0.61 0.15 -----   
                
Q5C  0.18 0.16 0.32  -0.03 0.26 0.30 0.21 0.43 0.36 0.10 -0.01 0.26 0.14 0.34 1.00
  0.97 0.83 1.81  -0.14 1.41 1.66 1.12 2.53 2.07 0.53 -0.08 1.40 0.75 1.91 ----- 
  0.34 0.41 0.08 0.89 0.17 0.11 0.27 0.02 0.05 0.60 0.94 0.17 0.46 0.07 ----- 
 
 